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Behavioral/Cognitive
Tuning the BrakeWhile Raising the Stake: Network
Dynamics during Sequential Decision-Making
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When gathering valued goods, risk and reward are often coupled and escalate over time, for instance, during foraging, trading, or
gambling. This escalating frame requires agents to continuously balance expectations of reward against those of risk. To address how the
human brain dynamically computes these tradeoffs, we performed whole-brain fMRI while healthy young individuals engaged in a
sequential gambling task. Participants were repeatedly confronted with the option to continue with throwing a die to accumulate
monetary reward under escalating risk, or the alternative option to stop to bank the current balance. Within each gambling round, the
accumulation of gains gradually increased reaction times for “continue” choices, indicating growing uncertainty in the decision to
continue. Neural activity evoked by “continue” choices was associated with growing activity and connectivity of a cortico-subcortical
“braking” network that positively scaled with the accumulated gains, including pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), inferior
frontal gyrus, caudate, and subthalamic nucleus (STN). The influence of the STN on continue-evoked activity in the pre-SMA was
predicted by interindividual differences in risk-aversion attitudes expressed during the gambling task. Furthermore, activity in dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) reflected individual choice tendencies by showing increased activation when subjects made nondefault
“continue” choices despite an increasing tendency to stop, but ACC activity did not change in proportion with subjective choice uncer-
tainty. Together, the results implicate a key role of dorsal ACC, pre-SMA, inferior frontal gyrus, and STN in computing the trade-off
between escalating reward and risk in sequential decision-making.
Key words: ACC; action selection; conflict; inhibition; pre-SMA
Introduction
When gathering goods to secure survival, agents continuously
need to estimate long-run reward expectations, and their associ-
ated risks. This is particularly pertinent in situations where risk
and reward expectations are highly coupled and escalate over
time, such as foraging, trading, or gambling. During foraging, for
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Significance Statement
Using a paradigmwhere subjects experienced increasing potential rewards coupledwith increasing risk, this study addressed two
unresolved questions in the field of decision-making: First, we investigated an “inhibitory” network of regions that has so far been
investigated with externally cued action inhibition. In this study, we show that the dynamics in this network under increasingly
risky decisions are predictive of subjects’ risk attitudes. Second, we contribute to a currently ongoing debate about the anterior
cingulate cortex’s role in sequential foraging decisions by showing that its activity is related to making nondefault choices rather
than to choice uncertainty.
The Journal of Neuroscience, May 11, 2016 • 36(19):5417–5426 • 5417
instance, the agent has to continuously balance the desire to col-
lect asmuch food as possible against the risk of predation (Davies
et al., 2012). Likewise, a stock trader has to decidewhether to hold
or to sell off a climbing stock that can at any time fall.
Recently, foraging-like task settings have been used to delin-
eate neural activity underlying risk and reward computation
during sequential decision making (Kolling et al., 2012, 2014;
Congdon et al., 2013; Mobbs et al., 2013; Economides et al.,
2014). Although these studies have gained important insights
into the neural underpinnings of sequential risk taking behavior
in foraging settings, they do not afford inference about the neural
networks involved in the trade-off between competing responses
as subjects respond with increasing caution to escalating risk and
reward. In the context of action selection, a right-hemispheric
inhibitory network consisting of the pre-supplementary area
(pre-SMA), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), caudate and subtha-
lamic nucleus (STN) has been implicated in reactive and proac-
tive stopping (i.e., “braking”) as well as response switching,
although always in the context of externally cued action selection
and inhibition (Aron et al., 2007, 2014; Jahfari et al., 2009; Neu-
bert et al., 2010; Rae et al., 2015). It is thus unclear whether and
how this network might be engaged in mapping external risk
variables to voluntary action selection and whether its dynamics
predict interindividual differences in risk-taking attitude.
To address these questions, we performed whole-brain fMRI
while healthy volunteers repeatedly rolled a common six-sided
die to accumulate rewards. With every throw, the accumulated
reward increased relative to the number of pips. However, in the
event of throwing a “1,” participants lost their accumulated total
for the round (see Fig. 1a). We modeled subjective choice evi-
dence and choice uncertainty based on subjects’ choice behavior.
For each choice, the realizable reward (i.e., the “accumulated
sum”) increased in parallel with the risk defined as the range of
possible outcomes (Markowitz, 1959; Voon et al., 2011). At each
decision point, the player had to balance the escalating risk
against the escalating reward when choosing between the two
options, namely, to continue rolling the die in the hope of win-
ning more, or to stop playing, contenting oneself with the
reward accumulated during previous rolls. In this experimen-
tal context, stopping can be conceptualized as voluntary inhi-
bition of the continue choice; thus, it can be expected that the
tendency to stop monotonically increases over time during a
gambling round. We therefore hypothesized that the in-
hibitory control network would already generate a steadily
augmenting “braking signal” during “continue” choices in
proportion to the accumulated sum.
In addition, the task enabled us to address an unresolved topic
with respect to the role of dorsal ACC (dACC) in sequential
decision-making. The dACC is associated with computing differ-
ent aspects of the value of choice options in the context of chang-
ing temporal constraints (Kennerley et al., 2006; Kolling et al.,
2014). Yet, it is controversial whether dACC tracks the value of
the nondefault choice (Kolling et al., 2012, 2014) or deals with
choice uncertainty (also referred to as decision difficulty) when
utilities of alternative choices are similar (Botvinick, 2007; Shen-
hav et al., 2014). By modeling subjective parameters of choice
uncertainty and stop probability, we were able to relate “con-
tinue” activity in ACC to choice uncertainty or nondefault
choice. A nondefault choice was defined as the choice to continue
throwing the die despite increasing subjective evidence for stop-
ping. In most experiments, the repeatedly chosen continue re-
sponse would be considered a default choice. However, in this
specific experimental setting, the context of an increasing subjec-
tive evidence for the stop decision gradually turns the continue
choice into a nondefault action.
Materials andMethods
Participants. We included 20 healthy volunteers (9 female), without a
history of drug abuse or neurological or psychiatric disorder. The South
Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur and Blume, 1987) confirmed that none
of the subjects was a pathological gambler. Two participants had to be
excluded. One participant misunderstood the instructions, and another
one had an abnormal anatomical MR scan. The study was approved by
the Copenhagen Ethics Committee (KF 01-131/03), and all subjects gave
written informed consent before participating in the study.
Sequential gambling task. The sequential gambling task was a single-
player version of the dice game “pig” (see Fig. 1a). The task created an
open-ended foraging-like environment where individuals were faced
with cumulative rewards of escalating risk. Each gambling trial started
with a 1.5–3.5 s (jittered) rolling phase where one of the six sides of a die
was chosen randomly, shown for 150 ms and then replaced by another
randomly drawn side of the die. Subsequently, the randomly chosen
outcome of the trial was shown for 2 s, together with the accumulated
gains gathered during this round. If the upper face of the die showed a
number of pips1 (i.e., rewarding throws), subjects were instructed to
press a buttonwith either the index finger or themiddle finger of the right
hand to continue throwing the die or to stop the round and bank the
accumulated gains. The association of the choices with index finger and
middle finger was counterbalanced across subjects. If subjects continued,
a new rolling phase started after the 2 s. If the surface of the die only
showedone pip, participants lost their accumulated total for the round. If
subjects decided to stop or if the outcome of the throw was a “1,” the
banked amount (0 in case of a “1”) was shown for 2.5 s until a new round
started. If the subject did not respond within the 2 s, the round ended
with a “0” amount to make sure that participants made relatively fast
choices. Subjects were told that they would play the dice game for 25min
and that they would be paid out their average earnings, including lost
rounds with zero earnings, after the experiment. Crucially, unlike in the
Balloon Analog Risk Task (Rao et al., 2008; Fukunaga et al., 2012; Schon-
berg et al., 2012), the increasing incentive for stopping in the pig game is
only driven by an increasing accumulated sum. Thus, risk is only increas-
ing with the spread in possible outcomes and is independent of the prob-
ability of losing which was 1/6 in all trials. Furthermore, unlike the
Angling Risk Task (Pleskac, 2008), the possible additional gain of con-
tinuing is variable and subjects can therefore only decide whether to
continue or stop once they see the outcome of a trial if accumulated sum
is driving their behavior. Subjects played the dice game for 25 min, lead-
ing to an average of 187 “continue,” 42 “stop,” and 34 “loss” trials.
PsychoPy software (version 1.74.01, www.psychopy.org; Peirce, 2009)
was used for task presentation on a back-projected screen that partici-
pants viewed with a coil-mounted mirror. After receiving task instruc-
tions, participants performed a short training session outside the scanner
to familiarize them with the task.
Imaging procedures. Participants were scanned in a Verio 3T scanner
with a 32-channel head coil (Siemens). A T2*-weighted EPI sequence
(TR 1.65 s, TE 26 ms, flip angle 74°) was used to map task-related
changes of the regional BOLD signal as index of regional neural ac-
tivity. The 910 brain volumes with 32 slices per volume were acquired
in ascending order with an in-plane resolution of 3 3mm and a slice
thickness of 3.2 mm (FOV 192  192  134.4, acquisition matrix
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64 64). The sagittal orientation of the brain volumes was aligned to
the anterior–posterior commissure line. Pulse and respiration were
recorded with an infrared pulse oximeter and a pneumatic thoracic
belt.
Behavioral modeling. As the subjects at each trial (except for loss
events) had to make a binary choice between “continue” or “stop,” we
formulated a simple logistic model of the choice behavior. At trial n, the
probability of choosing the stop response was modeled using a logistic
regressionmodel as follows: pstopxn 
1
1 expw1xn  w0
, where
xn is the accumulated sum in trial n and w0 and w1 are free parameters.
The Certainty Equivalent (CE) was defined as the accumulated sum cor-
responding to a stop probability of 0.5 (see Fig. 1c,d).
Analysis of the fMRI data. Image processing and analysis were per-
formed with SPM8 (revision no. 4667, Wellcome Department of Imag-
ing Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/). EPI images were slice time corrected to TR/2, realigned to the
mean EPI image, normalized to a standard EPI template of the MNI
using affinewarping and aDCTbasis (Ashburner and Friston, 1999), and
smoothed with an 8 mm kernel (FWHM). We also processed the images
with a smaller 3 mm kernel to increase the spatial resolution of dynamic
causal modeling (DCM) and to prevent merging of local activation in
STNwith activation in neighboring brain structures (de Hollander et al.,
2015). All subsequent analysis steps were the same for both types of
preprocessed images. To correct for low-frequency drifts, data were fil-
tered in the temporal domain with a high-pass filter with a frequency of
1/128 Hz. For the imaging analysis, we formulated a voxelwise GLM,
which modeled the three main events of interest, “loss,” “stop,” and
“continue” events. Each event was modeled at the onset of the outcome
presentation using stick functions convolved with the canonical hemo-
dynamic response function as implemented in SPM 8. We also modeled
additional regressors of no interest (round feedback screens, rolling
phase, a “1” as the first outcome, no-response events, 24 regressors to
remove residual movement artifacts (modeled with an expansion [six
parameters] of the estimatedmovement from the rigid body realignment
procedure (Friston et al., 1996), cardiac pulsation (sixth expansion or-
der) and respiration (fourth expansion order; retrospective correction
technique RETROICOR) (Glover et al., 2000).
In the first-level model, we added parametric first-order polynomial
modulations to the three main events of interest. For “stop” and “con-
tinue” events, we added (in the order mentioned) the following: (1) the
accumulated sum; (2) the trial-specific prediction error (PE) defined as
the actual outcome minus the expected outcome reflecting both the ad-
ditional amount gained plus the size of the loss avoided, i.e., at trial n:
PEn  yn  200 xn16 , where yn denotes the die outcome in trial n
and the expected outcome is the average expected additional win 2006 
minus the 16 probability of losing the accumulated sum from trial t-1
(xn-1); (3) stop probability at the currently accumulated sum; and (4) the
trial-specific choice uncertainty reflected by the first derivative of the
logistic choice model with respect to the sum at this trial. The parametric
modulation of continue events with stop probability reflects increasing
evidence for choosing the stop response while subjects nevertheless con-
tinue and thus a nondefault choice. The first derivative of the stop prob-
ability function is a measure of choice uncertainty because it peaks at the
point of maximal steepness of the stop probability function, which by
definition is the subject’s CE where the subjective utility for continuing
and stopping are equal and uncertainty thus is highest. For “loss” events,
we only added one parametric modulation using the sum lost.
Accumulated sum correlated with several variables, such as prediction
error, stop probability, and choice uncertainty (average Pearson r across
all 18 subjects: accumulated sumwith prediction error 0.679, accumu-
lated sum with stop probability  0.839, accumulated sum with choice
uncertainty  0.869, prediction error with stop probability  0.514,
prediction error with choice uncertainty  0.537, stop probability with
choice uncertainty 0.829). This prompted us to use two different first
level designs. Onemodel had nonorthogonalized regressors to allow for a
more precise interpretation of the variance assigned to the regressors
(i.e., where the regressors only explain variance in the neural signal that is
not shared with the other regressors) (Mumford et al., 2015). If not
mentioned otherwise, any reported results are based on this model.
However, given the regressors’ correlations, we chose a second design
with serially orthogonalized regressors for the analysis of connectivity
modulations in the inhibitory network (orthogonalized model). In this
design, all regressors are orthogonalized to the one (or ones) before it,
whereas in a nonorthogonalized design, the variance shared by our re-
gressors is not attributed to any regressor (Mumford et al., 2015). Al-
though all of our regressors capture distinct aspects of the cognitive
processes in this game, they all show an increase in value at least for the
first trials of each round. In this second design with serial orthogonaliza-
tion, accumulated sum is attributed all the variance sharedwith the other
regressors and thus reflects a combination of the effects of concurrently
increasing risk and reward, together with the associated increasing tendency
to switch responses as well as increasing deliberation about the choice. This
regressor thus does not reflect a sharply defined cognitive construct, but
multiple effects, which are related to the sequential nature of this gambling
paradigm and jointly gave rise to themodulation of the inhibitory network.
Given the imprecise psychological interpretationof accumulated sum in this
case, we termed it “cumulative gambling” regressor in this model. We ran a
secondGLMwith serial orthogonalization toascertain that the effectsof stop
probability and choice uncertainty were not influenced by the order of the
orthogonalization of the regressors. This GLM was the same as the first
model with serial orthogonalization, only that we did not include the stop
probability regressor.
The obtained voxelwise parameter estimates of the resultant regressors
were transformed to whole-brain statistical parametric maps of t values
(SPM{t}) of the effect versus baseline. The resulting individual t-contrast
maps were then taken into a second-level random effect, between-
subjects analysis performing a one-sample t test on the effect of interest
across the group. At the second level, we also correlated the individual
t-contrast maps of the effects of interest with our subject-specific mea-
sure of risk tolerance (CE).We report findings at standard threshold p
0.001, uncorrected, at whole-brain level (corresponding to a t value
3.646) with a cluster extent threshold of 30 voxels and cluster-level
p  0.05, FWE-corrected. Given our a priori interest in the motor-
control network, including pre-SMA, right IFG, caudate and STN, we
performed small volume corrections (SVCs) for those regions with ana-
tomical masks (for STN: ATAG mask [https://www.nitrc.org/projects/
atag], for the other regions: AAL atlas from theWFUpick atlas toolbox in
SPM 8) if they did not show significant activation at standard threshold
in the two relevant contrasts associated with increasingly risky decisions,
accumulated sum, and stop probability.
DCM. Current theories of response control highlight three modes of
cortico-basal ganglia-cortical connectivity. First, a direct “Go” pathway
(cortex-striatum-internal segment of pallidum [GPi]-thalamus-cortex)
having a net excitatory influence on cortex. Second, an indirect
“NoGo” pathway (cortex-striatum-external segment of pallidum [GPe]-
STN-GPi-thalamus-cortex) with a net inhibitory influence on cortex and
third, a hyper-direct “NoGo” pathway from cortex directly to STN also
with an inhibitory influence on cortex (Aron, 2011). GLManalysis with a
model with orthogonalized regressors revealed that activity gradually
increased in these key inhibition areas with the cumulative gambling
regressor when subjects choose to continue with gambling (for details,
see Results). This raised the question whether this rise in activity reflects
a context-dependent modulation of these pathways with escalating risk
and reward.
To address this question, we specified a two-state DCM (Marreiros et
al., 2008) comprising four key regions in the inhibitory network: right
caudate head, pre-SMA, right IFG, and right STN (see Fig. 3a). We used
the parametric modulator of cumulative gambling as input modulating
the connections in the network. The trial types of “loss,” “stop,” and
“continue” were modeled as direct perturbation of each region. Even
though we use all three trial types to model the driving input of events in
the course of the dice game, the models are compared with regard to the
Meder, Haagensen et al. • Network Dynamics during Sequential Gambling J. Neurosci., May 11, 2016 • 36(19):5417–5426 • 5419
effect of cumulative gambling on the coupling between regions during
“continue” trials only. The model space was defined by all combinations
of sum-modulated connections between the regions, where we modeled
both indirect (via caudate) and hyperdirect connections from cortex to
STN, with a direct connection from STN back to cortex (see Fig. 3d).
While we only model a monosynaptic connection from STN to cortex,
the actual connection most likely is polysynaptic (e.g., via GPi and thal-
amus) (Yasoshima et al., 2005). However, in DCM, the net effect of a
polysynaptic connection can be modeled by only one parameter. We
were interested in comparing different feedforward cortex-to-STN cou-
pling dynamics via the indirect and hyperdirect pathway.
As a first step,we extracted the first eigenvariate from theROIs for each
subject according to the following anatomical criteria: for right caudate
head, pre-SMA, right IFG, and right STNwe constructed amask that was
the inclusion image of (1) an anatomical mask (STN: ATAG mask
[https://www.nitrc.org/projects/atag], for the other regions: AAL atlas
from the WFU pick atlas toolbox in SPM 8) of the ROI and (2) the
second-level SPM{t} of “continue” modulated by “sum” at a strict vox-
elwise threshold of 0.0001, thus restricting the SMA ROI to pre-SMA (y
 0) and the caudate ROI to caudate head. For right IFG,we used anAAL
mask corresponding to the pars opercularis and triangularis. We then
created the final ROI by taking the individual SPM{F} images of the effect
of interest (F-contrast over the paradigm). For caudate head, pre-SMA,
and right IFG, we thresholded these at a liberal p 0.05 uncorrected and
then extracted the first eigenvariate from spheres with 4 mm radius cen-
tered at the global maximum from voxels included in both AAL and the
second-level contrast map. For right STN, we included all voxels within
the ROI defined by ATAG mask (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/atag).
The signal from the STN ROI was derived from the analysis run on
images that were smoothed with a 3 mm kernel. The eigenvariates were
adjusted with the F-contrast over the paradigm.
TheDCMwas specified as follows. For a vector of regional activities, x,
and a vector of experimental inputs u, the bilinear DCMwas formulated
as follows:
dx
dt
 A  uiBi x  Cu
Here A denotes the context-free (u  0) coupling matrix. We chose a
fully reciprocally connected system. For the input vector u, we chose the
main conditions of “loss,” “stop,” and “continue” plus the parametric
modulation of sum on “continue” trials (cumulative gambling regres-
sor). The three main conditions entered as direct input to all regions
(Cmatrix). The parametric modulator of sum on “continue” entered as
“modulatory” input (ui), multiplied on different Bimatrices that consti-
tuted the model space (see Fig. 3a).
We used the two-state version of DCM (Marreiros et al., 2008)
where each region is modeled with an excitatory and inhibitory sub-
population and interregional connections are constrained to be pos-
itive. In this formulation, the above matrix (A 	 uiBi) is replaced by
uij  expAijuBij.
The uij are the prior couplings between regions i and j and are con-
strained to be positive for different regions i and j. Thus, posterior esti-
mates of Bij  0 will scale the prior and context-free coupling with a
factor 1  expuBij in the context of u.
Model space was explored by comparing 16 models, which featured
different context-dependent coupling architectures (Bmatrices).Models
1–15 correspond to different combinations of indirect or hyperdirect
cortico-basal ganglia-subthalamo-cortical pathways (see Fig. 3d). In
model 16, the sum regressor was used instead of the “continue” regressor
as input to all regions via theCmatrix as a “null”model where there is no
contextual modulation of connectivity (Bmatrix of 0). Because the ROIs
used in this DCM are identified on the basis of a second-level effect of
cumulative gambling, amodel where sumdoes not enter as either a direct
or modulatory input is not plausible and is therefore not included in the
model space. Seventeen subjects entered subsequent analysis. One sub-
ject had flat-line fits and was excluded.
Results
Sequential decision-making under increasing risk
Participants became more hesitant to continue with gambling,
the more money they had gathered during a sequential gamble
trial. This was reflected by the reaction times for “continue”
choices which increased linearly with the accumulated gain of the
gamble (one-sample t test over individual regressionweights, p
0.001, t(17) 5.47; parameters were normally distributed accord-
ing to Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p 0.62). All but one subject
had positive regression weights, showing that this effect was
highly consistent across subjects (mean 4.93, range 0.84 to
9.71).
Stopping behavior during the dice game could in principle be
determined by a strategy of setting a fixed threshold of either
accumulated sum or simply of number of throws, but no subject
displayed such a stereotypic behavior. Indeed, all subjects showed
a variable stopping behavior with respect to both the accumu-
lated sum and the number of throws when stopping. We then
established which of these predictor variables best accounted for
the observed stopping behavior using logistic regression. Three
plausible strategies would use (1) accumulated sum, (2) number
of throws, or (3) a combination of both. Comparing the Bayesian
Information Criteria (BIC) scores for the “sum” and the “num-
ber of throws” model revealed a very strong evidence (Kass and
Raftery, 1995) in favor of the “sum” model, showing a mean
difference in BIC scores of 11.6. This model had a mean adjusted
r2 of 0.47 (SD 0.15). Adding number of throws to the “sum”
model only contributed insignificantly, improving the BIC score
by 1.51.
For all participants, the “sum” model revealed a positive sig-
moidal relation between stop probability and accumulated sum
(Fig. 1d). From these functions, we derived the CE as a task-
related metric of participants’ risk preference: The CE corre-
sponds to the accumulated sum at which the player is indifferent
between continuing to throw the die or to stop; in other words,
both actions are of equivalent utility (Fig. 1c). Playerswith lowCE
values stopped early, contenting themselves with a relatively low
monetary reward taking less risk. Players with high CE values
tried to achieve a higher payoff, seeking more risk. CE varied
considerably across players. There was a single outlier with a very
high CE (CE  365, z  3.25), the remaining CE values ranged
between 94 and 260 Danish Kroner (DKK; 1 DKK
 $0.17 US),
indicating considerable interindividual differences in sequential
risk-taking behavior during gambling (Fig. 1d).
The optimal gambling strategy formaximizing expected value
is to continue throwing the die as long as the expected gain per die
throw exceeds the absolute expected value of the loss. The cross-
over point for this game then is the accumulated sum at 200DKK
(Fig. 1b). In other words, an economically rational player should
switch from continuing to stopping after having earned 200DKK
(Fig. 1d, red line). However, computing this decision boundary is
not intuitively obvious, and none of the subjects used the strategy
of abruptly switching from “continue” to “stop” decisions at this
amount. At the group level, the mean CE value was significantly
lower than the optimal CE of 200 DKK (160.6 33.8 DKK; p
0.026) and subjects stopped at amounts 200 DKK in only
20.5 21.2% of all stop decisions. This indicates that most sub-
jects were risk averse during sequential gambling. We found no
correlations (p 0.76) between our experimental (i.e., CE value)
and external measure of risk attitude, the Domain Specific Risk
Taking Scale (DOSPERT) (Blais and Weber, 2006).
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Activity increases scaled to cumulative gambling
When players decided to continue the gamble, there were no
significant linear increases in BOLD activity with accumulated
sum and only one significant decrease in the left inferior parietal
cortex with the standardmodel without orthogonalization. After
SVC, there was significant activity in the right caudate (Table 1).
In the orthogonalized model where all the variance shared
with other regressors is attributed to accumulated sum, a set of
brain regions showed a linear increase in BOLD signal with
this cumulative gambling regressor (Fig. 2a; Table 2). Activa-
tions included the predicted “braking” network with pre-
SMA, right IFG extending into anterior insula, ventral
striatum extending into the head of the caudate nucleus, and
STN (Fig. 2b). In addition, a large bilateral cluster encompass-
ing the dorsal portion of the ACC along with bilateral dlPFC
and bilateral inferior parietal cortex, the ventral striatum as
well as bilateral V3/V4 showed an increase in activity with
cumulative gambling. Linear decreases in activity with cumu-
lative gambling were observed in a left inferior parietal cluster,
corresponding to area PG in left angular gyrus and precuneus
(Table 2).
Dynamic changes in subthalamic-to-cortex connectivity
DCMwas used to explore the effect of cumulative gambling on
functional connectivity in cortico-basal ganglia-subthalamo-
cortical pathways during “continue” trials (Fig. 3). We ex-
tracted the signal from STN based on images smoothed with a
smaller 3mm kernel to achieve higher spatial resolution and to
avoid a spill-over of the signal of neighboring brain regions
into the STN (de Hollander et al., 2015). Fixed-effects analysis
at the group level (Stephan et al., 2010) revealed a winning
model in which both the indirect right IFG-caudate-STN
and pre-SMA-caudate-STN connections as well as the
subthalamo-cortical connections from STN to right IFG and
STN to pre-SMA were modulated by cumulative gambling
(Fig. 3b,d). This combined model, which featured an indirect
Figure 1. The pig dice game.a, Trial types. Each trial startedwith a rolling phase for 1.5–3.5 s, afterwhich the randomoutcomewas shown. If a throw yielded a pip number between 2 and 6, the
pipnumbermultipliedby10DKKwasaddedas reward to theaccumulatedearnings for the round.After each rewarding throw, subjects chosewhether to continue rolling thedie (i.e., CONTINUE trial)
or to stop and bank the cumulated gain (i.e., STOP trial). If the pip number of a throw was 1, participants lost the entire gain that had been accumulated during the round (LOSS trial). b, Relation
betweenexpectedvalue for additional gains (green line) or losses (red line) and theaccumulatedearnings inDKKduringagambling round. Theexpectedvalueof theadditional gainper throw(green
line) remained constant during a gambling round and was derived by the mean pip number per rewarding throw multiplied by the probability to win and the factor 102  3  4 
5  6 
1
6
 10. The expected value of loss per throw (red line) steadily increased during the gambling round and equaled the accumulated summultiplied by the loss probability (1/6).
The coordinate where the red and green lines cross each other indicates the point where expected values for additional gain and loss were equal. At this point of the game, corresponding
to accumulated earnings of 200 DKK, the player ought to stop because the expected value of losing starts to outweigh the expected value of the additional gain. c, Logistic regression
modeling of individual stop probability. Stop probability was described as a sigmoid function of accumulated sum during sequential gambling. The CE corresponds to the accumulated
earnings (in DKK) where the likelihood to stop equals the likelihood to continue throwing a die (dashed lines). d, Logistic stop probability functions of all participants (n 18). There were
considerable interindividual differences in the distribution of choice behavior. No participant showed a choice behavior that matched the optimal gain-maximizing strategy. The
objectively optimal choice behavior is illustrated by the red line, representing a step function with an abrupt switch from continuing to stopping when the accumulated earnings
are DKK 200.
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connection from both pre-SMA and
right IFG via caudate to STN and a di-
rect pathway back to cortex as winning
model, had a posterior probability of

99% (Fig. 3b). For the winning model,
mean percent variance explained by the
DCM across all subjects was 16% (range
3%–34%).
Extracting coupling values from the
winning model’s B matrix revealed that
the coupling from STN back to both cor-
tical areas increased in proportion with
cumulative gambling. The mean expo-
nentiated coupling scale parameter was
1.53 from STN to pre-SMA, which
was significantly different from 0
(t(16)  16.29, p  0.001, Bonferroni
corrected). Parameters were normally
distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
p  0.878). The mean exponentiated
coupling scale parameter was 1.26 from
STN to right IFG (t(16)  17.42, p 
0.001, Bonferroni corrected). Parame-
ters were normally distributed (Kolm-
ogorov–Smirnov test, p  0.466). Although the modulatory
influence of cumulative gambling was modeled for the
cortico-caudate-STN connections as well, there was no signif-
icant increase or decrease of coupling by cumulative gambling
at the group level on these connections. At the individual level,
the change in STN-to-pre-SMA connectivity with cumulative
gambling, as reflected by the mean coupling scale parameter,
predicted interindividual variations in gambling behavior
(Fig. 3c). After removing the subject with the highest CE from
the correlation based on the Mahalonobis distance measure
(CE 365, Mahalanobis distance 9.53, p 0.004), individ-
uals with more cautious gambling behavior showed a stronger
influence of STN on pre-SMA during continued reward seek-
ing under escalating risk than individuals displaying more
risky behavior. The stronger the increase in STN-to-pre-SMA
coupling with cumulative gambling, the smaller were individ-
ual CE scores (adjusted r 2  0.26, p  0.048, Bonferroni
correction).
Neural correlates of stop probability
A higher stop probability during a “continue” trial reflects the
need to overcome an increasing evidence to choose the alterna-
tive “stop” option. A cluster in dACC showed a linear effect of
increasing stop probability when subjects nevertheless decided to
continue. Further activity scaling with stop probability was seen
in parietal and frontal areas (Fig. 4a; Table 1). Because we were
specifically interested in how the stopping network of pre-SMA,
right IFG, caudate nucleus, and STN would be modulated by
increasing sum and stop probability (both parameters being re-
lated to increasingly risky decision), we performed SVC for these
predefined areas of interest. Bilateral STN, left caudate, and pre-
SMA showed a significant increase in “continue” activity with
Table 1. Significantly activated clusters in themodel without serial orthogonalizationa
Region
z Score
peak
Peak MNI coordinates: right
hemisphere
z Score
peak
Peak MNI coordinates: left
hemisphere
x y z x y z
Task-related activity during “Continue” trials showing a linear increase
with accumulated sum
Caudate (SVC) 3.88 14 22 8
Task-related activity during “Continue” trials showing a linear decrease
with accumulated sum
Inferior parietal cortex 5.93 56 62 34
Task-related activity during “Continue” trials showing a linear increase
with stop probability
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 5.35 0 30 26
Anterior insula 5.42 30 16 16 4.88 28 18 12
Middle frontal gyrus 4.91 32 42 20
Inferior parietal cortex 4.54 60 48 38 4.27 54 52 48
Hippocampus/thalamus 4.38 20 12 10
Precuneus 4.19 16 48 26
Subthalamic nucleus (SVC) 3.93 4 12 14 3.85 10 10 2
Caudate (SVC) 4.08 10 4 14
Pre-SMA (SVC) 4.52 10 24 46
aSignificant activation peaks (z score) and the corresponding stereotactic x, y, z coordinates in MNI space from the standard model without serial orthogonalization. Results are significant at p 0.001, uncorrected, at whole-brain level
(t 3.646), cluster extent threshold30 voxels, cluster-level p 0.05 FWE-corrected.
Figure 2. Color-coded statistical parametric maps showing clusters where task-related brain activity during “continue” trials
scaled positively with cumulative gambling. a, Linear effect of cumulative gambling from the model with serially orthogonalized
regressors at the onset of “continue” trials (one-sample t test, n 18) in ventral striatum and caudate head bilaterally, pre-SMA/
MCC/ACC, bilateral IFG extending into anterior insula, and thalamus. All statistical parametric maps are thresholded at an uncor-
rected p 0.001. Peak z scores and corresponding stereotactic coordinates are listed in Table 2. b, An ROI analysis (SVC) in STN
revealed a significant linear effect of accumulated sum on “continue” activity in right and left STN. For illustration purposes, we
show the unthresholded SPM in the bilateral STN mask used for the SVC.
5422 • J. Neurosci., May 11, 2016 • 36(19):5417–5426 Meder, Haagensen et al. • Network Dynamics during Sequential Gambling
Figure 3. DCM of effective connectivity in the inhibitory control network. a, The modeled network; “continue,” “stop,” and “loss” events perturbed all regions of the network;
cumulative gambling modulated the connections between the areas. The model space (d) explored which of the connections were modulated by cumulative gambling. b, The winning
model. Solid black and red arrows indicate connections modulated by cumulative gambling. Dashed arrows indicate unmodulated connections. The winning model, as revealed by
fixed-effects analysis, shows a modulation of the indirect right IFG–STN and pre-SMA–STN connections by cumulative gambling. Red arrows indicate only the coupling from STN to
pre-SMA, and rSTN to right IFG increases significantly with the cumulative gambling regressor at the group level. Numbers next to the red arrows indicate the exponentiated mean
coupling scale parameters ( p 0.001 for STN-to-pre-SMA and p 0.04 for STN-to-IFG, Bonferroni corrected). c, Linear relation between the CE values and exponentiated coupling value
from STN to pre-SMA (n 16). The individual coupling value is predictive of the risk attitude displayed during the task, as reflected by CE. d, Display of the 16 connectivity models tested
within the DCM framework. The four circles represent the regions shown in a. Solid arrows indicate connectionsmodulated by cumulative gambling. Dashed arrows indicate unmodulated
connections. Red box represents the winning model shown in b. In the null model (model 16), the connections were not modulated by cumulative gambling, and the perturbing input
into the network from “continue” was replaced with cumulative gambling.
Table 2. Significantly activated clusters of cumulative gambling in themodel with serial orthogonalizationa
Region
z Score
peak
Peak MNI coordinates: right
hemisphere
z Score
peak
Peak MNI coordinates: left
hemisphere
x y z x y z
Task-related activity during “Continue” trials showing a linear increase
with cumulative gambling (accumulated sum)
Ventral striatum extending into caudate head 5.99 14 10 4 5.22 12 4 2
Pre-SMA 5.90 6 16 52
Dorsal ACC 5.64 6 26 38
Visual area V3/V4 4.73 48 62 20 5.37 22 100 0
Inferior frontal gyrus 5.24 42 24 6 5.29 32 22 10
Inferior parietal cortex 5.10 32 54 52 4.24 46 36 42
Thalamus 5.08 8 16 14
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 4.87 32 52 26 4.68 34 56 20
Subthalamic nucleus (SVC) 4.96 8 16 12 4.67 6 14 12
Task related activity during “Continue” trials showing a linear decrease
with cumulative gambling (accumulated sum)
Inferior parietal cortex 5.15 40 82 38
Precuneus 3.81 4 60 20
aSignificant activation peaks (z score) and the corresponding stereotactic x, y, z coordinates in MNI space for cumulative gambling in the model with serially orthogonalized regressors. Results are significant at p 0.001, uncorrected, at
whole-brain level (t 3.646), cluster extent threshold30 voxels, cluster-level p 0.05 FWE-corrected.
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stop probability, but we found no effects of stop probability on
right IFG or right caudate activity (Fig. 4b).
Neural correlates of choice uncertainty
Although stop probability reflects the continuously increasing
evidence for the subject to take the safe choice, its first deriv-
ative with respect to accumulated sum (a bell-shaped function
peaking at the CE) indicates in which phase of sequential gam-
bling subjects are most uncertain about whether to continue
or to stop. Even though this modulation reflects an ostensibly
salient point in the game, we found no brain regions where
“continue” activity varied in proportion to choice uncertainty.
To assure that this null-finding was not due to shared variance
with the stop probability regressor that was not assigned to
either regressor, we ran another general linear model without
the stop probability regressor. Again, we found no significant
activations associated with choice uncertainty.
Discussion
We investigated the neural dynamics during the decision between
a risky “continue” choice with the possibility of higher reward
and a safe “stop” choice with a known outcome. This type of
decision is prototypical of foraging behavior where the forager
needs to weigh the incentives of future foraging against the prob-
ability of losing the opportunity to harvest its gains. It allowed us
to investigate the inhibitory network dynamics underlying
voluntary response switches during sequential decisions. Fur-
thermore, because subjects were unable to solve the optimal gain-
maximizing strategy, this experimental setting allowed the
modeling of subjective evidence for the two available options
under overt contextual constraints. Comparing the effects of stop
probability and choice uncertainty during “continue” choices on
ACC activity, we were able to contribute to an ongoing debate
about this region’s function in sequential decision-making.
Balancing caution and greed
At the behavioral level, participants became gradually more hes-
itant to continue with gambling the more money they had accu-
mulated. This was reflected by a linear increase in reaction times
for “continue” choices with the accumulated sum. Although
there was substantial interindividual variation, on average, par-
ticipants were more likely to stop than to continue at amounts
that were significantly lower than the optimal amount of DKK
200. This is in good agreement with the notion that most people
are aversive to risk with known probability in a gain frame (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). As a
side note, we found no correlation between individual CE values
as behavioral index of the individual risk attitude and our exter-
nal measure of risk taking (DOSPERT scale). It has been shown
that several behavioral measures of risk taking do not vary in
proportion with the DOSPERT, suggesting that the DOSPERT
might not reflect all aspects of risk-taking attitude (Mishra and
Lalumie`re, 2011).
Sequential risk taking and the braking network
In the standard model without orthogonalized regressors, accu-
mulated sum only showed one cluster with a significant decrease
in activity in the left inferior parietal cortex, and, after SVC, an
increase in right caudate. This shows that most of the variance
explained by the cumulative gambling regressor in the orthogo-
nalized model is shared with the other regressors and thus not
easily assigned a specific psychological construct.
Several brain networks gradually increased neural activity
with the cumulative gambling regressor in the orthogonalized
model showing a pattern of activation similar to the results in a
study on the Angling Risk Task (Congdon et al., 2013). In this
model, the cumulative gambling regressor is assigned all the vari-
ance shared with the other regressors and thus reflects both risk,
anticipated accumulated reward at the next outcome, as well as
increasing deliberations about action selection. Therefore, these
regions may trace the increase in possible future reward, the in-
creasing risk caused by the increase in possible loss amount, or
theymight trade off the increasing reward and risk. The cluster in
the right IFG extended into the insula, a region associated with
risk processing (Preuschoff et al., 2008). Even though the neural
effects of cumulative gambling cannot be interpreted unequivo-
cally, this shared variance contains all the aspects of cumulative
gambling that are relevant with regard to theirmodulatory effects
on connectivity between the four key nodes of the inhibitory
network. The accumulation of gains resulted in a linear increase
of neural activity in the pre-SMA, right IFG, STN, and caudate
nucleus. These regions form a functional network that has been
implicated in reactive (e.g., stop signal tasks) (Munoz and Ever-
ling, 2004; Chikazoe et al., 2009; Rae et al., 2015) and proactive
stopping tasks (Jahfari et al., 2009; Aron, 2011) where a possible
stop can be anticipated (“braking”), but also in action switching
(Neubert et al., 2010).
Figure4. Color-coded statistical parametricmaps showingareaswhere task-relatedactivity
during continue trials increased with stop probability. a, The dorsal ACC, right insula and adja-
cent IFG, left middle frontal gyrus, right thalamus, left and right IPC (supramarginal gyrus, area
PF), and right superior frontal gyrus show a linear increase in activity with increasing stop
probability during “continue” trials (one-sample t test, n 18). All maps are thresholded at an
uncorrected p 0.001. Peak z scores and the corresponding stereotactic coordinates are listed
in Table 1.b, An ROI analysis in STN revealed a bilateral increase in activitywith stop probability
after SVC. For illustration purposes, we show the unthresholded SPM in the bilateral STN mask
used for the SVC.
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Connectivity analysis revealed that a combined “indirect”
cortico-basal ganglia-cortical pathway best accounted for the
ramping-up of the braking network. Importantly, the coupling
strength from STN back to cortex increased with cumulative
gambling, suggesting that fast interactions between cortical con-
trol regions and STN are modulated by the level of reward and
risk in the sequence. Two mechanistically different explanations
may account for the gradual increase in STN-to-cortex connec-
tivity with increasing sum (Keuken et al., 2015). First, it may
reflect an excitation of the “continue” response in combination
with inhibition of competing responses (Nambu et al., 2002),
gated by the basal ganglia receiving modulatory dopaminergic
input. Second, the STN might mediate a gradual buildup of
global action inhibition to prevent premature responding and
allow adequate response selection under escalating risk (Frank,
2006). Our finding that reaction times grow linearly with cumu-
lative gambling is consistent with the latter interpretation.
The increase in connectivity strength from STN to pre-SMA
in the context of increasing stakes predicted interindividual vari-
ations in risk attitude as reflected by individual CE values. This
finding indicates that subjects with a tendency to stop already at
low stake amounts show a faster ramping-up of the connectivity
increase from STN to pre-SMA than individuals who stop at
higher amounts on average. Subjects with a lower CE are by def-
inition less inclined toward being exposed to the risk of large
losses. Hence, the dynamic buildup of STN influence on pre-
SMAmay reflect a neural correlate of responding with increasing
caution. In support of this view, Cavanagh et al. (2014) found
that STN activity was related to increased response caution after
errors. Pre-SMA has also been found to increase its activity when
preparing for a stop signal (Jahfari et al., 2009) and in proportion
to increases in accuracy in conflict tasks (Forstmann et al., 2008).
Differences in recruitment of STN-to-pre-SMA connectivity
during sequential risk taking may therefore provide a partial
mechanistic explanation for these interindividual differences. It
should be noted that DCM is a model-fitting technique that only
allows a relative comparison of the specifiedmodels (Lohmann et
al., 2012).
Stop probability
In addition to neural networks computing objective levels of risk
and reward, the nature of the task enabled us to investigate neural
activity related to subject-specific choice tendencies, as reflected
by the individual stop probability. Activity in dACC, insula, bi-
lateral IPC, and middle frontal gyrus was scaled to the individual
probability to stop. In other words, these areas became gradually
more active when subjects nevertheless continued to gamble de-
spite their choice tendency to stop. This ramping-up of activity in
a frontoparietal network might reflect anticipatory activity pre-
ceding a “stop” choice and is compatible with a contribution to
cued behavioral switching (Braver et al., 2003) and action switch
in a reward context (Gla¨scher et al., 2009).
Nondefault choice and choice uncertainty
Investigating the neural correlates of stop probability and its first
derivative reflecting the level of choice uncertainty allowed us to
distinguish between two competing hypotheses of ACC function.
On the one hand, several studies suggest that dACC is involved in
tracking the value of the nondefault choice (Kolling et al., 2012,
2014; Boorman et al., 2013; Mobbs et al., 2013), whereas others
argue that it encodes choice uncertainty, when the subjective
utility of the available options is similar (Botvinick, 2007; Shen-
hav et al., 2014). It should be noted that, in the latter studies, the
options’ similarity in value is called decision difficulty. We refer
to this measure as choice uncertainty to distinguish it more
clearly from ourmeasure of stop probability because the decision
to continue despite a high stop probability can also be considered
a difficult decision. Recently, one study suggested that the value
of the nondefault choicewas confoundedwith choice uncertainty
in the studies by Kolling et al. (2012, 2014), arguing for the choice
uncertainty hypothesis (Shenhav et al., 2014). In our task, high
stop probability values exceeding 0.5 imply a decreasing choice
uncertainty as the value difference between the two options in-
creases. We found increasing activity in dACC while subjects
chose the nondefault “continue” response despite a high stop
probability where choice uncertainty is decreasing. Furthermore,
we did not find dACC activity correlating with the choice uncer-
tainty regressor. Both findings together argue against the choice
uncertainty theory of dACC function. Compared with the study
by Kolling et al. (2012), the continue choice was the most fre-
quently chosen action in our sequential gambling task, and it was
the context of the high stop probability that rendered it a nonde-
fault choice. Therefore, we infer that the dACC activity associated
with making a nondefault choice is not just a reflection of having
to perform an action that is different from the most frequently
chosen response, but rather associated with making a response
that is not the normal response in the current state.
In conclusion, this study characterized the neural dyna-
mics associated with sequential risk taking under conditions of
escalating reward and risk. We found that sequential risk-taking
progressively engages a cortico-striatal-subthalamic “braking”
network and that the scaling of connectivity within this network
is linked to the expression of low-risk choice behavior. On the
other hand, we find that the dACC is involved in choosing the
continue choice over an increasing tendency to stop and thus
mediating nondefault choices rather than choice uncertainty.
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